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HOW SHOULD SOCIAL SECURITY BE
REFORMED?AP ANEL DISCUSSION
POLITICAL ASPECTS OF SOCIAL SECURITY
REFORM
Peter A. Diamond*
We have been asked to summarize what we have learned here at the
conference and reach a consensus for policy recommendations—a great
goal, but I know you will not be surprised to hear that I am going to
disappoint you. Let me begin with a few questions. First of all, did Social
Security reduce saving? My answer is, I hope so. As we heard from
Edward Berkowitz, in the early days of the system, the whole point of
speeding up the payoff was to give more consumption to the elderly. To
do that, however, you had to have less saving. The purpose of the system
then was to decrease saving.
It is difﬁcult to criticize a program for successfully accomplishing
what it was set up to do. But understanding this background to Social
Security does not mean we cannot ask now whether it would be good to
increase saving through the Social Security system. That is an independent
question.
We have heard a number of references here to whether increasing the
economy’s saving should in itself be considered good. To answer this
question, one must ask whose consumption would go down now as a
result, and whose consumption would go up later. Reducing the con-
sumption of the poor now to increase the consumption of the rich in the
future is a very different policy from reducing the consumption of the rich
now to increase the consumption of the poor later. (One does need to
consider the interest rate in both these calculations, but it likely would be
swamped by changes in the other factors.) It is important to recognize,
thus, that questions about the effects of increased saving are ill-posed
when they are put too generally.
*Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.Almost all the discussion here has been about tax increases, that is,
about partially funding Social Security. We have heard little discussion of
the three alternative ways of managing the fund, which are the heart of
the three plans from the Social Security Advisory Council. For shorthand,
I will refer to them as the IRA plan or the personal security accounts
plan, where almost any ﬁnancial intermediary would do to administer
investment choices; the 401(k) plan, Ned Gramlich’s individual ac-
counts plan, where the government would set up portfolios; and of
course the maintain beneﬁts plan, which would have direct investment of
the trust funds.
Henning Bohn has pointed out that on economic grounds, deﬁned-
beneﬁt investing in the stock market is preferable to deﬁned-contribution
investing, because the former has the advantage of risk-sharing over
generations. That advantage is a fundamental difference between these
ways of investing in the stock market.
If we focus instead on administrative costs, then investing the trust
fund in the stock market beats either of the deﬁned-contribution methods
as well. For such administrative costs, the Advisory Council’s estimate
was one-half a basis point for investing the trust fund in the stock market
(as in the maintain beneﬁts approach), 10.5 basis points for the 401(k)
approach, and 100 basis points for the IRA approach, although that
estimate is controversial.
When considering these issues, it is interesting to look at some of the
evidence from Britain. The British personal pension program takes an
approach similar to the IRA plan, except that it is voluntary. Their
average personal pension plan has a load of 8 percent, a charge of 90 basis
points on assets, and a monthly fee of two and one-half pounds. Some of
their pension funds recently have become much cheaper or offer index
funds, and now appear quite similar to our mutual fund market. The
spread in loads and administrative charges between individual funds is
enormous, however. A relatively inexperienced British public is making
its own investment decisions in this program, so one ﬁnds the plans all
over the place in their patterns of risk and return.
Signiﬁcant ﬁxed costs are associated with this IRA-type approach to
a pension system. As a result, the poor will end up with lower rates of
return than the rich on what they save. This has been an issue in Chile,
where over the ﬁrst decade of their new IRA-type pension system they
found almost a 5-percentage-point difference in the after-tax rate of return
between the low earners and the top earners, because of the ﬁxed portion
of the charges.
So if a deﬁned-beneﬁt plan has been established as superior to a
deﬁned-contribution system both for maximizing risk-sharing and for
minimizing administrative costs (and I would also argue that it is
superior in its ability to provide insurance, given the difﬁculties in our
individual annuity markets), what is the debate about? The answer is that
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economics. The economics are fairly clear, as Ned Gramlich has noted.
Unfortunately, this conference did not devote a session to the politics of
Social Security reform, so I fear one cannot move directly from the
conference to policy conclusions.
How do politics inﬂuence the current debates? One way is through
the issue of what would happen to the rest of the government budget if
we raised the payroll tax to fund Social Security. I was surprised this
point was not mentioned more here. Diane Macunovich made reference
to the Social Security surpluses “ﬁnancing the deﬁcit” through the 1980s.
The idea here is that the large deﬁcits of the 1980s were enabled by
accounting techniques that included Social Security surpluses on the
income side, making the deﬁcits appear smaller than they would have
otherwise. This, in turn, made it easier for politicians and the public to let
the deﬁcits continue to grow, rather than cutting expenditures or raising
taxes. I disagree with Macunovich’s argument, however. In my view,
decisions about the size of the budget deﬁcit essentially were indepen-
dent of the size of the surpluses being run by Social Security. The
argument is that we had big deﬁcits and the rate at which we reduced
them was driven by the difﬁculty in cutting expenditures and the
reluctance to raise taxes. And somebody would be saying the number is
$250 billion rather than $190 billion. I just do not think that would have
had a lot of effect on the budget decisions that happened.
Looking to the future, what kind of accounting changes might the
government get into, to try to redeﬁne the budget deﬁcit? And what
political implications would follow from that redeﬁnition? Under existing
rules, if the Social Security trust fund were to sell bonds in order to
purchase equities, that would be considered an expenditure. The situa-
tion is similar to that of the federal government selling assets to reduce
the measured deﬁcit. This is Larry Kotlikoff’s criticism of standard deﬁcit
measures. If large changes to Social Security are on the horizon, the
Congress will change how we measure the deﬁcit to something they can
live with politically. It is not clear how such changes will play out, but
clearly we have been assuming that any tax increase for Social Security
will not show up in the rest of the government budget as increased
consumption spending.
Having noted objections to the IRA-type plans, what are the main
objections to the deﬁned-beneﬁt plans? Scott Pardee voiced the central
objection, which is that politics may inappropriately inﬂuence the federal
government’s investment decisions. If the Social Security trust fund is
invested directly by the government, as in the maintain beneﬁts plan,
such political inﬂuences are clearly a danger. These concerns hold almost
as directly under the 401(k) plan but would not apply at all under the IRA
plan, which gets the government out of the business of making invest-
ment decisions.
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ment system, which has double insulation— from politics to the invest-
ment decisions. The ﬁrst layer of insulation is the Trustees, who have
ﬁduciary responsibilities to the beneﬁciaries and are not permitted to
focus on anything else. The second layer of insulation is the fact that these
Trustees are only allowed to invest in index funds, thus precluding them
from making substantive investment decisions. They do make choices
between particular funds and indexes: Do we go with the S&P 500 or with
the Wiltshire? But beyond that, they have little discretion to direct the
system’s funds.
Setting up a system with some of these safeguards does not guaran-
tee insulation. The state of Florida, for example, just decided to move civil
servants’ pension funds out of tobacco companies, as it is suing those
companies. This decision was made by a board of three elected govern-
ment ofﬁcials, not an independent board of trustees.
The issue to keep in mind is, what would the politicians like? Does
a system with these safeguards provide them with a politically stable
equilibrium? In my view, the answer to this question is “Yes.” Politicians
often like having their hands tied: “Sorry, I cannot do anything about
that.” And the investment of pension funds is deﬁnitely included in that
category. Indeed, when the federal employees’ pension system was set
up, Congress made it clear they were interested only in a system in which
they did not pick stocks. Moreover, corporate America would recognize
that tobacco companies, for example, were just the thin edge of the wedge
—that the stocks of many other companies potentially could be targeted
by those making the investment decisions, and for a variety of political
reasons. There are no guarantees, but it seems to me that all of corporate
America would be backing that ﬁrewall against individual stock-picking,
once it was up. It seems to me that the risk associated with such a ﬁrewall
would be reasonable relative to the return, even if one considered nothing
more than the administrative costs associated with each reform plan.
When thinking about these risks associated with politics, it is
important to spell out the implications for the entire pension system. One
cannot simply carve out the deﬁned-contribution part and claim to have
improved the risks there, without accounting for what has been done
about the system as a whole. The personal security accounts (IRA) plan
has a ﬂat beneﬁt, supplemented by the proceeds of individual accounts.
The 401(k) plan relies mostly on a deﬁned-beneﬁt system, so one really
must think about the entire system. When focusing on the ﬁnancial
implications of the system, it is the long-term budget that matters and
that impinges on the system as a whole. I would argue that the division
between deﬁned-beneﬁt and deﬁned-contribution plans probably makes
very little difference, by comparison.
Ned Gramlich asked earlier, should we worry whether deﬁned-
beneﬁt and deﬁned-contribution systems can coexist? Will we see the
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ﬁrst, which Henning Bohn mentioned, is that for as long as we keep the
present Social Security system, it must pay interest on the unfunded
liability. Now where would that interest payment come from in the 401(k)
or the IRA plans? In both cases, it would come from the deﬁned-beneﬁt
portion of the system. Ned did not propose to put 1.6 percent of taxes
towards the deﬁned contribution, only to have 1.3 percent show up there
with the rest going to pay the unfunded liability. One hundred percent of
the taxes for the deﬁned contributions show up in the deﬁned-contribu-
tion part. But 100 percent of the taxes for the deﬁned beneﬁts do not show
up in the deﬁned-beneﬁt part. Someone who did not understand the full
complexities of Bohn’s paper might conclude that a deﬁned-contribution
system would be superior to a deﬁned-beneﬁt system. But that would be
a mistake.
The second reason for concern about the coexistence of deﬁned-
beneﬁt and deﬁned-contribution systems comes from what Douglas
Bernheim calls wealth illusion. It is the ﬂip side of the “pennies-a-day”
sales strategy—for just pennies a day you can have this wonderful stereo
system. Cognitive psychologists know that to ensure reasonable judg-
ment when comparing two quantities, both must be measured in the
same units. In the typical calculations used in debates about privatization,
however, one frequently sees the ﬂow of taxes or the ﬂow of deﬁned
beneﬁts compared to the stock of wealth an average individual would
have in a deﬁned contribution plan. But those are different units. And I
think there is a tendency to believe that the stock is larger than the ﬂow
even when they are worth the same.
Anecdotal evidence to support this point comes from experience
with pension windows. When an employer offers a pension window with
a supplement to a deﬁned-beneﬁt ﬂow, employees generally are not very
interested. But when an employer offers a pension window with a lump
sum payment, employees ﬂock to it even if it is signiﬁcantly less than the
deﬁned-beneﬁt ﬂow they found unattractive. So I am inclined to think
that perception is the real issue here.
The third reason for concern about the coexistence of deﬁned-beneﬁt
and deﬁned-contribution systems is that the redistributive aspects of the
current Social Security system might be undermined. The redistributive
aspects of the current system operate through its deﬁned-beneﬁt provi-
sions. Given a mixed system, the people who are most politically
sensitive would be aware that they were not doing as well in the deﬁned-
beneﬁt portion of the system and might not recognize or value its
redistributive aspects, and they might push for changes to it. In sorting
out the implications of any reform plan, one must pay attention to these
political elements. This is true whether the concern is potential political
interference in the capital markets or about preserving important aspects
of the current system, such as its social insurance characteristics.
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concerns me a great deal. As we all know, poverty among the elderly is
concentrated among widows. If, in the future, we have a decline in
annuitization or, as in the individual accounts plan, a choice in the mix
between a survivor pension and a worker pension, how will this play out
for widows? This will depend on the rate at which wealth stocks are run
down, if they are taken as lump sums. It will also depend on the extent
to which individuals are sensible investors or take risks and make bad
investments. We should be concerned, therefore, about the income
distribution implications of those reform plans that include no annuiti-
zation or survivor protection, which are an essential part of our current
system.
292 Peter A. DiamondPANEL DISCUSSION:
IT’S HIGH TIME TO PRIVATIZE
Laurence J. Kotlikoff*
I want to propose a solution to the Social Security crisis that
addresses many of the concerns about privatization raised today by Peter
Diamond and others. Let me begin by summarizing brieﬂy the concerns.
One concern repeatedly voiced is what fees, loads, and other charges
might be levied on deﬁned-contribution accounts. A second is that
reforming Social Security would eliminate the progressive beneﬁts sched-
ule and hurt the poor.
A third issue is that of intergenerational equity in funding. Some of
the proposed reform plans involve issuing large amounts of debt. The
question in such plans then becomes whether the debt would be paid off
or end up as a burden that future generations would have to pay. Some
of the plans out there really are ways of relabeling what we already are
doing and do not effectively address the intergenerational equity issue.
A fourth concern is the protection of secondary earners. The current
Social Security system has fairly substantial beneﬁts for dependents.
Consider a nonworking spouse staying at home caring for the children.
How would he or she be protected under a privatized system?
A related issue, also mentioned by Peter Diamond, is that of
annuitization. The current Social Security system pays its beneﬁts in the
form of annuities. But we know that the private annuity markets, both in
the United States and in other countries, are quite imperfect because of
problems of adverse selection. How do we deal with that in a privatized
system? If individuals are not annuitized, they do not have insurance
against life span uncertainty. If they do get annuitized, the bad risks may
contaminate the market and make the pricing of annuities unfair.
*Professor of Economics, Boston University.Keeping these concerns in mind, let me propose a solution to the Social
Security problem conceived by Jeffrey Sachs and myself, which relies on a
scheme to privatize Social Security. I will then outline how our plan, entitled
the Personal Security System, addresses fundamental concerns that Peter
Diamond and others have raised about privatizing Social Security.
Let me begin by pointing out what our proposal does not do. It does
not touch the survivor insurance or disability insurance parts of Social
Security. People will continue to contribute to these programs. Both the
disability insurance and the survivor insurance taxes would continue to
bring in sufﬁcient contributions to pay for these beneﬁts on a pay-as-
you-go basis. So those programs would not be altered at all.
What would change is that the old age insurance contribution—the
contribution to the retirement portion of Social Security—would go into
private accounts called personal security accounts. Before going into one
of these accounts, however, two things would happen to any contribu-
tion. First, if you were married, it would be divided 50-50; half would go
into your account, and half into your spouse’s account. If both spouses
work, then the two contributions would be pooled, with half of that pool
going into each person’s account. Each spouse would automatically have
an equal-sized account, thus protecting secondary earners. These reforms
also would provide more divorce protection than is afforded by the
current system, in which a marriage must last for a minimum of 10 years
for one spouse to collect any dependent beneﬁts from the other spouse’s
earnings record.
Second, before a contribution was put into one of these personal
security accounts, the government would provide a matching contribu-
tion on a progressive basis. That is, low contributors would get a
government match and high contributors, people who are contributing a
lot because they are earning a lot, would get no government match. So the
progressivity the government would like to introduce in the system
would be clear—everyone could understand precisely how much redis-
tribution within a generation was occurring.
The balances in these personal security accounts would be invested
in various index funds approved by, though not managed by, the
government. An example of such a fund might be a world index fund, in
which individuals would invest in the entire world portfolio of stocks and
bonds, on a market-weighted basis. Rules for diversiﬁcation and regulation
would ensure that everyone was in the market all the time. Even if
individuals went from one investment company to another they could only
purchase the same types of security. They would not be able to “time” the
market, to sell at low prices and buy at high prices—this system of personal
accounts would provide protection against that type of behavior. Hence
individuals would be forced to invest for the long term.
When people reached age 65, their account balances would be jointly
annuitized with those of all others who were 65. Each year the govern-
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current cohort. The company offering the lowest fees and also meeting
other obvious criteria would win the competition. We would thus have
full annuitization, with single-life policies. They would be inﬂation-
protected, so the insurance company would hedge its liabilities through
the purchase of inﬂation-indexed bonds. Since Social Security’s survivor
beneﬁts would still be available, elderly widows and widowers would
receive these beneﬁts as well as their Personal Security System annuities.
What about the existing Social Security system? How would we pay
off its unfunded liability? That is, how would we pay beneﬁts to current
retirees as well as to current workers when they hit retirement? Current
retirees would receive their full beneﬁts unchanged. Current workers
would receive their full accrued beneﬁts, calculated as of the time of the
reform, when they reached retirement age.
That is, only the earnings contributed to the Social Security system
before the reform would be counted in their earnings record. But no one
would accrue any further beneﬁts under the old system, with this proposal.
If I am 46 at the time of the reform, for example, my earnings record would
show zeros after that age. So my accrued Social Security beneﬁt under our
proposal would be exactly the same beneﬁt as I would receive under the
current system were I to leave the country and go to the Fiji Islands at age 46
and return at age 62 and ask for my Social Security beneﬁts.
This means that when my generation and other working generations
reached retirement age we would receive less in Social Security retire-
ment beneﬁts than otherwise would be the case. And over time, aggre-
gate Social Security retirement beneﬁts owed to successive retirees would
decline to zero. That is, with the passing of time, only zeros would be
ﬁlled in for earnings for increasing numbers of workers, and for increas-
ing shares of the total years counted in those workers’ earnings records.
But how would we pay for those current and accrued Social Security
retirement beneﬁts during the 40- to 50-year transition period? We view
the accrued liability of the old system as a collective obligation. Everyone
needs to help pay it off, in order to protect future generations. They are
being burdened with so many other obligations, given our current health
care system and other government programs. We need to help future
generations, and do it soon.
So our plan would pay off this obligation with a federal retail sales
tax or a value-added tax. The former has some advantages over the latter
because a sales tax is a more transparent way to tax consumption. On the
other hand, a value-added tax might be more acceptable politically.
Because Social Security beneﬁts are indexed against inﬂation, individuals
dependent on Social Security beneﬁts would be insulated from any
increase in the price level that might come from passing a federal retail
sales tax. Because their beneﬁts automatically would be adjusted, the
poor elderly subsisting on Social Security (and roughly 40 percent do live
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posal.
Why should we use a consumption or value-added tax? It is very
important that the current wealthy and middle-class elderly assist in
paying off this unfunded liability. They are currently receiving enormous
transfers that are growing in real terms, through the Social Security and
Medicare programs. And, like everyone else in society, they need to help
pay for the excesses of the past. Such a tax thus reinforces our plan’s
emphasis on generational equity. Over time, we would end up with a
fully funded, privatized social security system that was intra- and
intergenerationally equitable and could be operated at extremely low
fees. If the plan had everyone contributing to a world index fund, the fees
for managing it probably would be priced by the ﬁnancial marketplace at
20 basis points or less. Currently, you can purchase an S&P 500 fund for
20 basis points. So the fee issue is really a red herring.
To summarize, under this plan you have low fees, generational
equity, progressivity through matching contributions, a real funding
mechanism, and protection of secondary earners as well as improved
provisions for divorce and survivor insurance. If you get divorced, your
account balance equals that of your former spouse. You have annuitiza-
tion at age 65. And if you die before age 65, your account balance will go
to your spouse or to your other designated beneﬁciaries.
Furthermore, the tax plan will also have some very important
macroeconomic effects. You have a consumption tax that starts out at
perhaps 8 to 10 percent, which would be paying not just for Social
Security beneﬁts but also for the government’s matching contributions to
the personal security accounts. Through time, that consumption tax
would fall to 2 or 3 percent. This declining rate would give people a
bigger incentive to save—to consume less in the present and more in the
future. It would act like a negative capital income tax.
This plan also has some good efﬁciency properties. People would see
that every dollar they contribute into their private accounts is closely
linked to their future retirement income—another difference from the
current system. Hence, we would have much better labor supply incen-
tives under our plan.
Moreover, using this consumption tax to retire the unfunded Social
Security liability would lead through time to higher national saving and
a higher capital stock—our simulations suggest roughly 40 percent
higher. These simulations also show a 14 percent higher long-run level of
output per capita, a 10 percent higher long-run real wage, and a 20
percent lower long-run real interest rate.
In conclusion, I think that privatizing Social Security can be done in
such a way as to deal with all the legitimate concerns of the naysayers. It
can also make a real contribution to improving our economic well-being
and that of our children.
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Alicia H. Munnell*
This panel is supposed to pull together the threads of earlier sessions,
deﬁne the trade-offs discussed, and offer guidelines for reform. As the
President has been concentrating on enacting a balanced budget and has
not yet turned his attention to Social Security reform, the Administration
does not currently have a position on how ﬁnancial balance should be
restored to the program. In April, however, the Social Security Trustees
submitted their report on the program’s ﬁnancial status, so we do have a
clear idea of the magnitude of the problem.
The Trustees’ Report shows clearly that the system is not fundamen-
tally broken. That does not mean that the system should not change. If we
think that current beneﬁts are too high or too low, we can change them.
If we would like to have some Social Security money invested in separate
accounts, we can do that. If we want to change the way we index beneﬁts,
we can alter the procedures. Social Security is a ﬂexible program that can
adjust over time. But any modiﬁcations to the program should be made
in the context of changing preferences or goals, not in response to a false
perception that the system is going to fail. Along these lines, therefore, I
would like to make ﬁve points about Social Security’s ﬁnancial future.
First, Social Security has enough money to pay 100 percent of promised beneﬁts
until 2029, when the trust fund is exhausted. Even after the trust fund is
exhausted, revenues would continue to meet about three-fourths of program
costs. Social Security is not about to disappear.
The Trustees annually publish projections of the system’s revenues
*Member, Council of Economic Advisers. Now Peter Drucker Professor of Management
Sciences at Boston College School of Management.and outlays for the following 75 years. They produce three sets of
projections corresponding to high-cost, low-cost, and intermediate sets of
assumptions. I believe that the intermediate scenario is based on the most
reasonable economic and demographic assumptions, so I will use them
for discussion.
Probably you all are familiar with these numbers, but they are worth
repeating. The intermediate projection shows that between now and the
year 2012, the Social Security system will bring in more money than it
pays out. That is, receipts from annual payroll taxes and from income
taxation of Social Security beneﬁts will exceed outlays.
Thereafter, the baby boom generation retires and costs rise. At the
same time, growth in the labor force slows, reﬂecting the big decline in
the fertility rate that occurred after 1960. This increase in the ratio of
retirees to workers causes the expenditures of the system to rise above
revenues.
In the relatively short run—from 2012 through 2018—the sum of tax
receipts and the interest on trust fund assets will produce enough
revenue to cover beneﬁt payments. After that, if no action is taken, total
income will fall short of beneﬁt payments, but the shortfall can be covered
by drawing down trust fund assets until the funds are exhausted in the
year 2029.
People talk about this 2029 date as if the whole Social Security system
implodes in that year and nothing is left. This is one of the great
misconceptions in the current debate—and it simply is not correct. Even
if no changes were made on the tax or the beneﬁt side of the equation,
current payroll taxes and beneﬁt taxation would provide enough money
to cover roughly 75 percent of beneﬁts in the year 2040 and roughly 70
percent in the year 2075. Thus, even without further legislation, the Social
Security system is not about to dry up.
So is there a problem? Yes, there is. When the surpluses in the early
years are combined with the deﬁcits in the later years, projected income
falls short of projected beneﬁt payments over the 75-year forecast period.
In other words, the system faces a 75-year deﬁcit. The key issue, however,
is the magnitude of that deﬁcit. This brings me to my second point:
Social Security is running a 75-year deﬁcit, but the actions required to eliminate
this shortfall are well within the bounds of previous changes to the program.
Under the intermediate assumptions, the 75-year deﬁcit amounts to
2.23 percent of taxable payrolls. One way to think about this magnitude
is in terms of the tax increase required to eliminate it. Let me be clear here
that I am not advocating a tax increase but merely a thought experiment.
If we decided to ﬁnance beneﬁts for the next 75 years by raising taxes,
today’s combined employee-employer tax rate of 12.4 percent would
have to be raised to 14.6 percent immediately. That would involve a 1.1
percentage point increase each for the employee and employer. No one
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solvency problem in this manner provides an easy way to gauge its size.
Is such a 2.23 percentage point tax increase large in historical
perspective? It is large, but not unprecedented. Between 1980 and 1990,
the combined employer-employee tax rate went from 10.16 percent to
today’s 12.4 percent—a roughly equivalent increase. Thus, the gap could
be closed with a not unprecedented rise in the payroll tax.
Does that mean that all the burden of eliminating the deﬁcit should
be placed on raising taxes? Deﬁnitely not. As you well know, Social
Security retirement and disability beneﬁts are not the only items being
ﬁnanced by the payroll tax. The Medicare program is growing much
more rapidly than GDP and will also be profoundly affected by the aging
of the baby-boom generation. It is important, therefore, to think of the
combined burden on future taxpayers when considering solutions to the
75-year deﬁcit in the OASDI program. Nevertheless, the second point that
I want to make is that the 75-year deﬁcit is manageable. It is possible to
eliminate the current deﬁcit and to maintain the bulk of the current
program.
This point deserves one caveat, because Social Security’s long-run
ﬁnancing is somewhat more complicated than the scenario I just de-
scribed. One could argue that the 75-year deﬁcit understates the magni-
tude of the ﬁnancial problem. Under current law, the Social Security tax
rate is ﬁxed while costs are rising, and this conﬁguration produces
surpluses now and large deﬁcits in the future. As a result of this proﬁle,
each passing year adds another year with a large projected deﬁcit.
Assuming nothing else changes, this phenomenon would increase the
75-year deﬁcit slightly each year, by 0.08 percent of taxable payrolls. In
contrast to what was done in 1983, many commentators now argue that
the system should not be left with a huge deﬁcit in the 76th year.
Therefore, a complete package of deﬁcit closers probably would include
some provisions for the out-years in addition to those required to
eliminate the 75-year deﬁcit. My third point is as follows:
The economic and demographic assumptions underlying the 75-year projection
are reasonable. This has been reafﬁrmed most recently by a Technical Panel of the
1994-1996 Social Security Advisory Council.
Projecting costs for the next 75 years is necessarily an uncertain
exercise. It is equivalent to having made estimates for today in 1922. We
would have had no idea about the Great Depression, World War II, or a
host of other demographic, economic, and social developments. Never-
theless, such long-range planning can be a prudent exercise. The useful-
ness of the exercise depends crucially, however, on the reasonableness of
the underlying assumptions. While the actuaries’ calculations involve
numerous variables, two demographic assumptions and one economic
relationship are key.
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Fertility tells us how many people will be in the labor force paying taxes,
and mortality tells us how many people will be receiving beneﬁts and for
how long.
Since 1800, the fertility rate has declined persistently in the United
States. The only signiﬁcant deviation from this trend was the post-World
War II baby boom. At the end of the baby boom in 1964, the fertility rate
resumed its decline until 1976, before rebounding slightly. Currently the
average woman would be expected to have 2.0 children over her lifetime.
Demographers agree almost unanimously that fertility rates will remain
low. As a result, the 75-year projections for the Trustees’ Report are based
on the assumption that the fertility rate will trend down slightly to 1.9
percent.
The consensus is that mortality also will decrease. This is important
because the longer people live, the more years beneﬁts have to be paid
after retirement. The question is how fast mortality will decrease. For the
75-year projections, the 1997 Trustees’ Report shows signiﬁcant gains in
life expectancy at 65, rising roughly three years by the year 2075 (reaching
18.8 years for men and 22.3 years for women).
On the economic side, a key variable is the difference between the
rate at which beneﬁts increase—namely, increases in the Consumer Price
Index (CPI)—and the rate at which tax revenues rise—namely, the
growth in wages. This difference is called the real wage differential.
The assumption about the size of the real wage differential is often
viewed as the most controversial in Social Security forecasting, as the
actual value has varied dramatically over time. During the 20-year period
before 1973, when productivity growth was high, the real wage differen-
tial averaged 2.2 percent. Since 1973, however, it has averaged 0.3
percent. The question is how much weight to put on recent years as
compared with the pre-1973 period. The Trustees have split the difference
and adopted an assumption of 0.9 percent. What if they are wrong? By
how much would a real wage differential of 0.3 percent, rather than the
assumed 0.9 percent, raise the 75-year deﬁcit? Sensitivity analysis shows
that such a miscalculation would increase the 75-year deﬁcit by roughly
0.6 percent of taxable payroll. In other words, a relatively large error in
this assumption, taken in isolation, would worsen long-term Social
Security ﬁnancing by a relatively modest amount during the next 75
years.
Of course, if a large number of assumptions all turn out to have been
optimistic, or all pessimistic, their cumulative effect could be quite large.
The Trustees’ reports show the results of two extreme cases: a “high-cost”
alternative in which all of the main assumptions are assumed to take
pessimistic values, and a “low-cost” projection that assumes optimistic
values. According to the 1997 Report, under the high-cost alternative, the
75-year balance is in deﬁcit by 5.54 percent of taxable payroll, more than
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contrast, the balance under the low-cost assumptions is a small surplus of
0.21 percent of taxable payroll.
These two projections give a sense of the level of uncertainty about
the long-term projections. Nonetheless, a 1994-95 Technical Panel to the
Quadrennial Advisory Council on Social Security evaluated each indi-
vidual assumption and concluded that, “The ‘intermediate’ projection . . .
for the OASDI program provide(s) a reasonable evaluation of the
ﬁnancial status. Although the Panel suggests that modiﬁcations be
considered in various speciﬁc assumptions, the overall effect of those
suggestions would not signiﬁcantly change the ﬁnancial status evalua-
tion.”
That is my personal view also. One can quibble with any particular
economic or demographic assumption, but taken as a whole they provide
a very reasonable picture of the future. My fourth point:
Even though deﬁcits reemerged after the 1983 enactment of the Greenspan
Commission recommendations, this is not likely to happen again. These deﬁcits
arose not so much from problems with the economic and demographic assump-
tions, which roughly offset one another, but rather from an upsurge in the
disability caseload and technical problems.
Critics might argue that we have ﬁxed Social Security before, and it
did not stay ﬁxed. Speciﬁcally, in 1983 Congress enacted legislation based
on the recommendations of a commission chaired by Alan Greenspan. At
that time, it was asserted that those recommendations were sufﬁcient to
keep the Social Security system solvent for 75 years, with positive trust
fund balances through the year 2060. Only a year after Congress enacted
the legislation, however, the Trustees began to project a small deﬁcit. That
deﬁcit has grown more or less steadily since then, to its current level of
2.23 percent of taxable payrolls. How did this happen? And will new
deﬁcits emerge once again even if we “ﬁx” the deﬁcit this time?
Let us start by talking about factors that are not—on balance
—responsible for the current deﬁcit, namely, the economic and demo-
graphic assumptions. Most of the discussions of Social Security’s ﬁnanc-
ing problems are couched in terms of the demographic shifts that will
occur as the baby boom generation ages. Indeed, as we remarked earlier,
the numbers are impressive; today 3.3 workers support each retiree, by
the year 2040 that number drops to 2.0, and it stabilizes at around 1.8 in
the year 2070.
The problem with this story is that the projected decrease in the ratio
of workers to retirees, frequently cited as the cause of the emerging
deﬁcit, is little changed from 1983. The decrease was fully incorporated in
the revisions made to the program at that time. Since 1983, if anything,
the demographic developments have been positive—at least from the
program’s perspective. Life expectancy assumptions have been lowered
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run costs from changing demographic assumptions was roughly offset,
however, by changing economic assumptions. In particular, the Trustees
lowered the assumed rate of real wage growth as it became clear that the
productivity slowdown was here to stay. On balance, the economic and
demographic changes have roughly offset one another.
Then you may ask, “Where did the deﬁcit come from?” Three major
factors caused long-term costs to increase. The ﬁrst one, which accounts
for about one-third of the problem, was discussed earlier. That is, as time
passes, the 75-year valuation period ends in a later year, so that more of
the higher-cost out-years are included in the projections. Including more
deﬁcit years raises the 75-year deﬁcit. The second is that the disability
caseload grew much faster than anticipated, primarily because of legis-
lative, regulatory, and judicial action that made it easier for individuals to
qualify for disability beneﬁts. Rising disability costs account for another
third of the problem.
The third source of the post-1983 deﬁcit—accounting for the ﬁnal
third of the problem—involves changes in the methodology used to
project the future. These changes are one-shot occurrences that are
unlikely to happen again. For example, the large increase in the deﬁcit
between the 1993 and 1994 Trustees’ Reports was due mainly to new data
suggesting that workers have more years of covered employment than
previously had been thought and therefore are entitled to higher pro-
jected beneﬁts.
The question is, if all these factors went wrong after the 1983
legislation, won’t the same thing happen again? My best judgment is no.
The ﬁrst factor—the fact that as time passes, years with large deﬁcits
replace years with surpluses in the 75-year picture—can be taken into
account in any reform. With regard to the second and third factors, it is
impossible to assess the likely direction, much less the magnitude, of any
changes that the actuaries inevitably will make. Social Security actuaries
will continue to incorporate improvements in data and methods, and one
would hope that as experience piles up and methods are tested and
retested, the need for major reassessment would decline. Finally, demo-
graphic and economic assumptions may have to be revised but, as I said
earlier, these are very reasonable assumptions and are as likely to be
revised in ways that reduce costs as increase them. In fact, it is easier to
think of two revisions that would lower costs—improvements in the CPI
and more immigration—than to think of factors that would raise costs.
This brings me to my ﬁnal point:
It is unhelpful to lump together Social Security and Medicare and characterize
the problem as “out-of-control entitlement spending.” This characterization does
not lead to useful discussion, since Social Security spending is not out of control
but rather quite predictable.
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would be silly to ignore the fact that the aging of the population will also
place increased demands on the Medicare program. But Social Security
and Medicare are driven by very different forces, and combining the
spending projections for these two programs muddies rather than clears
the waters.
In some ways, the two programs could be described as similar. Both
programs provide a deﬁned beneﬁt—the one cash, the other insurance for
a package of medical services—to roughly the same population: the aged
and disabled and their families. Neither the populations covered nor the
beneﬁts provided under either program have changed much in the last 15
years. Medicare presents a much greater challenge than Social Security,
however, both in the magnitude of the projected deﬁcit and in the
complexity of the issues. Unlike Social Security reform, Medicare reform
involves not just selecting among a list of plausible beneﬁt options, but
rather ﬁguring out how to control the volume and intensity of utilization
while ensuring the efﬁcient delivery of quality health care in one
component of a very complicated health care system.
In short, combining Social Security and Medicare is very unhelpful
packaging, since—except for the aging of the population—the costs of the
two programs are driven by different forces. The more that Social
Security’s OASDI program can be discussed separately from the health
care issues, the more productive will be the dialogue.
CONCLUSION
Let me conclude with two facts. First, Social Security retirement and
disability beneﬁts now are equal to 4.7 percent of GDP. To hear critics
talk, one would think that this fraction would triple or quadruple by the
year 2075. According to the intermediate assumptions in the 1997
Trustees’ Report, OASDI outlays will amount to only 6.8 percent of GDP
in the year 2075. Social Security spending simply is not out of control. The
program does face a 75-year deﬁcit, however, that should be eliminated
in order to restore conﬁdence in it.
This leads to the second fact. The changes required to restore balance
to the Social Security program are relatively modest and could be done
within the structure of the current system, if action were taken today. If
the problem is let slide, say until the year 2020, we will no longer have the
option to make modest adjustments. In the year 2020, the magnitude of
the deﬁcit will require more radical revamping. But that is not true today.
The 1997 Trustees’ Report, based on very reasonable economic and
demographic assumptions, shows a program in need of modest repair
—not one fundamentally broken.
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Occasionally I have a dream where I attend or testify before a
congressional committee such as the Senate Finance Committee. In this
dream, I am watching the committee in action when suddenly someone
runs in and shouts, “Eureka! We have found a cure for cancer!” And
everyone in the gallery starts cheering. Then I look up at the committee
members behind the podium and they all appear nervous and are wiping
their brows. And suddenly I realize what the members are thinking: “Oh
my gosh, this expensive cure means people are going to live longer. Social
Security will go bankrupt, Medicare costs will skyrocket, and the budget
will go bust. In short, the whole world will fall apart.... ”
In some ways, my dream illustrates fairly accurately our broader
budgetary debate with respect to Social Security. We discuss Social
Security as a general policy issue, but the problems it causes in the budget
are unique. Certainly in other areas where the social problems seem to be
worsening, such as in our central cities, in education, or crime, we look
for additional resources in the budget to try to tackle them.
But the problems associated with retirement and Social Security are
improving, yet we continue to allocate increasing resources to them. We
have a strange upside-down budget, not just in the United States but
throughout the industrialized world, where we devote increasing shares
to our least serious problems.
If one focuses on the four major sources of growth with respect to
programs for the elderly, three of them are potentially under our control.
But at present our spending on them is on automatic pilot. The ﬁrst of
these sources is the growth in real annual beneﬁts. From its inception,
*Senior Fellow, The Urban Institute.Social Security has had wage indexing, which causes this growth in
annual real beneﬁts. Wage indexing might appear to be a reasonable
structure for a pension plan. I would argue, however, that it is not
necessarily a reasonable structure for an unfunded system. One could
make an equivalent argument that we should have real growth in
educational expenditures or in other areas valued by us as a society,
particularly those that are unfunded. But then everything would have
automatic growth built in.
The second source of growth is the increase in years spent in
retirement. Those of us who spin the numbers know that had we indexed
Social Security for longevity when it started, we would not be sitting here
having this conference. We might be debating whether Social Security
should be funded or not, similar to the 1930s debate. But we would not
be focused on its large ﬁscal problem.
A third source of growth is the way we design health insurance.
Health insurance is indexed to grow even faster than wages, mainly
because health is an income-elastic good and our system is organized in
such a way that we provide every service we possibly can as a society.
This creates all sorts of incentives for cost-increasing technology and
other potential distortions, and over time it leads to higher and higher
costs.
The fourth source of growth, not as easily controlled, is our declining
fertility rate. Regardless of where we set the retirement age or how we
measure who is old, at some point we are going to have a higher
percentage of the population who are truly old and have greater needs.
To the extent that our government responds to the greater needs of its
society, it will have to respond to this problem.
Three of these four sources of growth, then, are really within our
inﬂuence. And in my view, a signiﬁcant part of any solution to the Social
Security budget problem should come from bringing these three sources
under control. The fourth source of growth is not as easily manipulated:
A higher percentage of our population is going to be truly elderly, and we
will have to adjust the system to meet their needs. The bottom line,
however, is that whether we fund or do not fund the system is an
important issue, but it is not crucial to ﬁxing the system budgetarily. One
of my concerns, as this debate circulates among the public and through
Washington, is the constant attention given to this funding problem to the
exclusion of other issues.
One can make a related argument with some simple mathematics
that the saving issue is the same sort of problem, important but often
misplaced. The current system is premised on a future tax rate of roughly
33 percent for Social Security, Medicare, and other programs for the
elderly together, relative to its current rate of 15 percent. That is not far
from the Congressional Budget Ofﬁce’s projection of an increase in cost
equal to roughly 9 percent of GDP. The Social Security tax base is roughly
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tax rate increase.
So the big saving and growth issue, in my view, is how to prevent the
tax rate from going from 15 percent to 33 percent. That is, can we drop the
promise to current generations from 33 percent back to roughly 15
percent? Whether we drop it further, from 15 percent to 10 percent, by
shifting money into private savings accounts, is also important but, at
least by this accounting, of a smaller order of magnitude.
One other related problem is how these cost increases add up. Under
current law, a couple with average income who retire today receive
promises of about one-half million dollars (in 1993 dollars) of Social
Security and Medicare beneﬁts, roughly half from each program. The
Medicare portion of course is driven by projections of huge cost increases.
These numbers do not decrease. As one moves towards the future,
the promised lifetime beneﬁts rise to $800,000 in real dollars for an
average-income couple. It is not pure rhetoric to claim that Social Security
and Medicare promise some people they will be millionaires in the future,
because higher-income people receive a higher level of Social Security
beneﬁts and those with longer life expectancies receive ever more
Medicare beneﬁts. Our system is providing tremendous resources to us in
our elder years. In my view, these beneﬁts are also large relative to what
we promised ourselves or our children in younger years. The question of
whether we are abandoning our young is intertwined with the question
of just how much we want to spend on ourselves as we age.
Can we solve this problem by altering saving behavior and building
physical capital? The main distortions in the present system are on the
human capital side and not on the physical capital side. Now as public
ﬁnance economists, we are very well-trained to examine saving and
investment issues. I am reminded of Bob Solow’s quip in his famous
debate with Milton Friedman. Solow said that while everything re-
minded Milton of the money supply, everything reminded him of sex,
but he kept it out of the conversation. As public ﬁnance economists, when
we debate these issues, everything reminds us of how we can manipulate
saving and investment to solve our problem.
One big distortion in the current system is that we have let it
determine expectations, rather than use it to respond to our greatest
needs. It tells us to retire for one-third of our adult lives and allocate our
consumption in distinct ways between cash and Medicare beneﬁts,
creating a dependence on the government irrespective of the relative
needs of society and the use it could make of our productive capabilities.
A number of distortions on the human capital side appear to dominate
the issue of what happens to physical capital. You cannot build enough
steel mills to solve the Social Security problem.
Only a couple of the papers presented here have discussed human
capital. Even the one focused on labor supply issues addressed mainly
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would affect labor markets—as opposed to the more direct issue of what
is happening to labor markets now because of the design of the systems
themselves. Several people even argued that we as economists can do
nothing. People are retiring earlier and earlier and it is a natural
phenomenon.
I would argue that over the past 50 to 60 years, we have spent
tremendous increments of our wealth as a society on more leisure and
more health care in retirement, at a rate much faster than the growth of
GDP. In the process, we have built up tremendous institutional barriers
to remaining in the work force beyond a certain age. The intertwined
nature of these barriers is one reason our econometrics are so weak at
estimating whether we can solve the problem by changing any one
individual policy, for example, by removing the earnings test.
What are these institutional barriers? One is growing Social Security
wealth. A second is Medicare wealth, which is growing even faster than
Social Security wealth. Such generous beneﬁts certainly create a wealth
effect, causing people to retire early. Furthermore, the signals government
sends out by setting the retirement age can have a powerful socialization
effect. Telling people 65, or even 62, is the retirement age is a powerful
signal.
Social Security heavily subsidizes early retirement despite the as-
sumption that the systems are actuarially fair to those who continue to
work, or at least one day will be fair when we get full delayed retirement
credit. That assumption is incorrect, as it compares potential beneﬁts at
different retirement ages, but fails to account for taxes. Workers pay in at
least 30 percent of their wages to government as taxes, while retirees do
not. Even if it were actuarially fair, the earnings test would still be
interpreted as a signal to retire. We also have a very powerful health care
earnings test—the requirement that Medicare be a secondary payer,
which poses a huge cost to employers who must pay for the health costs
of older workers. Like the government, for reasons I will not go into here,
the private sector has also built up institutional barriers to work over the
past few decades and encourages early retirement. We must start to move
in the opposite direction and remove these barriers, one by one.
What principles should then apply to Social Security reform? Our
focus today has been mainly on two somewhat opposing principles—the
social adequacy of Social Security versus its efﬁciency and individual
equity. But I would argue that we need to return to even more funda-
mental principles. We must ask ourselves what we are trying to do with
this system in the ﬁrst place. There is such a thing as target efﬁciency,
even for a program whose primary goal is equity. For example, if we
want to keep the elderly out of poverty, let us be target-efﬁcient about it
in ways that reduce the cost of the system and thus bring efﬁciency gains.
When one looks at Social Security in this light, a number of budgetary
PLANS FOR A COMPREHENSIVE REFORM PACKAGE 307principles emerge, among them that provisions for automatic growth of
beneﬁts take ownership of the budget away from current generations.
They are prevented from spending to meet their greatest needs because of
the automatic growth in these systems. Automatic growth provisions also
create an unlevel playing ﬁeld in deciding among various expenditures.
So what type of reform package makes the most sense? A principal
goal should be to increase the retirement age. I take a stronger stand on
this than most. We should agree upon a promised number of years of
retirement such as 15, 16, or 17, and then hold it steady. That is, it should
be a ﬁxed index. We should stop promising ourselves larger percentages
of life or ever more years in retirement. If, on a discretionary basis, we
decide individuals should have more years of retirement, ﬁne. We can
then explicitly debate spending on Social Security versus education versus
everything else. But we should no longer automatically increase the
promised number of years of retirement as our life expectancy increases.
Today, the system promises people retirement at 62, which provides
about 17 years of retirement to a male and about 20 years to a female. For
the longer-living of the two, the actuarial pension actually lasts about 25
years already. I think that is an excessive amount. I certainly would not
let it grow and in fact I would reduce it slightly, to deal with the
demographic problem that is approaching.
Along the lines of the Gramlich proposal, I would reduce the
indexing of beneﬁts. The exact ratio by which I would achieve this
depends on several factors. I probably would be less harsh at the
bottom—and would allow for some indexing of wages for a minimum
beneﬁt provision. But in essence, I would signiﬁcantly reduce this other
major source of growth of Social Security.
Then I would focus on what the system is trying to do—for example,
reduce poverty among the elderly. The U.S. system has performed poorly
compared to other countries’ systems in moving the elderly out of
poverty. One would think that such an expensive system, spending so
much money, should easily accomplish this aim. In fact we have done a
fairly mediocre job. But this would be an easy problem to solve—along
the way, we could also resolve many of the redistributive issues that
emerge when cutting back on beneﬁts. It is fairly easy to take care of those
at the bottom, and some real efﬁciency gains could thus be had at very
small cost.
I would also include all contributions to Social Security in the beneﬁt
calculation. In the beneﬁt formula, a ﬁnal bracket gets a small rate of
return, which supposedly is how we introduce progressivity into the
system. But in fact, most contributions at the margin get nothing. So a
very rich person who begins work late or retires early can actually get this
marginal return from the last bracket while someone who works for more
than 35 years often will get nothing for working the 36th year. Many
two-earner couples, because of the design of spousal beneﬁts, get nothing
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be reconﬁgured to get substantial reductions in the net marginal tax rate
(tax less beneﬁt) for Social Security without necessarily affecting the
distribution, as long as one compensates a bit in the progressivity of the
beneﬁt formula. And a number of potential efﬁciency gains like this are
available.
On the tax side, Social Security actuaries project the tax base will
continue to erode because of fringe beneﬁts, mainly health and private
pension beneﬁts. I would not necessarily reduce the exclusion for many
private pension beneﬁts. On the health beneﬁt side, however, a cap on the
tax excludability of health beneﬁts would mean all sorts of nice efﬁciency
gains throughout the system. It would also help bring about a better,
fairer tax system.
As already noted, we should create greater equity among couples
and among caretakers. That is, secondary earners are treated badly in the
current system. Those who have two earners in the family get substan-
tially fewer beneﬁts or pay substantially more taxes than a single-earner
couple who pay exactly the same amount into the system. So there are
great inequities here. I would move the system towards earnings sharing
and counting at least some marginal return for each contribution to Social
Security. To deal partially with the problem of unacceptably high poverty
rates among widows, I would make some actuarial reductions for couples
so they receive a lower initial beneﬁt, in exchange for a higher beneﬁt
when they are very old—again, to be target efﬁcient.
The Social Security program should be aimed at the old old—that is
where the needs are. The near-elderly in their sixties are not the people to
whom we should be directing more and more beneﬁts. The process of
having the system give us increasing years of retirement results in more
beneﬁts to those who have the least need of them. The system, thus, is
increasingly target inefﬁcient, because payments increasingly are going to
people who are further from death and the conditions likely to surround
death, such as disability.
What would I abolish from the current system? I would abolish the
earnings test, because it is a bad signal to society. I also would abolish
what I call the health earnings test, that is, Medicare being the secondary
payer, because it pushes employers with health plans to remove elderly
workers from their payrolls.
Let me conclude by stating my position with respect to the funding
issue. I am sympathetic to having more funding in Social Security. My
reasons are conservative relative to those who are promising large
increases in economic growth if there is more funding. I think that more
funding results in a better budget mechanism, since the government then
recognizes its liabilities as it incurs them. In a system that must provide
some minimum level of beneﬁt to so many people, I believe that there is
not much one can do to reduce the current tax rate. This consideration
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ing a minimum beneﬁt, not much leeway remains in a system collecting
only 10.4 percent for OASI, particularly if individuals retire for one-third
of their lives, and the demographic changes continue to move us toward
two workers or less for every Social Security beneﬁciary.
In effect, I would move in the direction of funding, but primarily
because it would establish the right budget rules. In the budget context,
the increased funding would count as a liability on a current basis, which
would tend to raise the measure of the current deﬁcit. This would, in
turn, put pressure on Congress to cut spending elsewhere. Can you get
very far, however, by putting only 2 or 3 percentage points of a tax rate
into an account, whether you do it a ` la Gramlich or a ` la the Committee for
Economic Development? Some proposals add such accounts to the
current system, others try to take a bit away from the system. Currently,
I am trying to better integrate improvements in the private pension
system to such an analysis. By itself, the private pension system does not
cover roughly half of all workers well by retirement and does not provide
much in the way of portable beneﬁts. Technically, the beneﬁts are
portable. But if you look at the deﬁned-beneﬁt side of the equation, they
are not indexed for those leaving work early. And so essentially, if one
leaves a deﬁned-beneﬁt plan before age 50, one receives very little,
regardless of how generous the system looks to those who work to
retirement age.
I would like us to consider ways to increase the subsidy for private
pension plans, but grant it only where the plans create some minimum
degree of portability. For example, one could introduce a guarantee of 8
percent of wages growing at the rate paid on government bonds over
one’s lifetime as the minimum portable beneﬁt a worker would get when
leaving a private plan. The government could provide a couple of
percentage points to help do this. Thus, in recent months, I have been
looking at alternative ways to take the small amount of money people are
talking about putting into a mandated plan and perhaps use it to
subsidize the private system, if it appears mandates are unacceptable. To
deal with the fact that some people are not going to fall into even an
improved voluntary system, the minimum beneﬁt of Social Security
could be beefed up even more to ensure some sort of social adequacy.
In sum, Social Security reform must be considered in a comprehen-
sive manner, and a whole package of provisions is required to make it
effective in meeting its basic purposes.
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